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Standard applications of  utility  theory  assume  that utility  depends  solely  on  outcomes  and  not  on 
causes.  This study uses a field experiment conducted in the Netherlands to determine if alternative 
causes of an environmental problem affect willingness to pay to ameliorate it.  We find evidence 
supporting the hypothesis that people are willing to pay significantly more to correct problems caused 
by humans than by nature (the “outrage effect”), but find no support for the hypothesis that “moral 
responsibility” matters.  We also find support for the hypothesis that stated willingness to pay values 
obtained via “cheap talk” and “consequential” treatments are lower than without inclusion of these 





Key words: field experiment, endangered species, non-market valuation 
   2
 
1.  Introduction 
  Outcomes of  environmental valuation studies frequently  are interpreted through the 
lens of a ‘purchase model’ [13] in which utility is a function of outcomes or consequences 
only. This perspective has been challenged both by psychologists and  economists who have 
recognized the importance of context and attributes of the good being valued.  This work 
implicitly  provides  a  transition  from  the  notion  of  pre-existing  well-behaved  preference 
orderings  toward  theories  of  ‘constructed  preferences’,  where  true  values  of  goods  and 
services might not exist, but rather are conditional upon context.  For example, Kahneman et 
al. [13], Kahneman and Ritov [14], DeKay and McClelland [8], and Brown et al. [1] provide 
evidence that people are willing to pay (WTP) more to avoid an environmental problem if they 
think it is man-caused than if they think it is an outcome of nature.  Kahneman et al. [13] refer 
to this as the "outrage effect".  Their empirical results suggest that intentional harm caused by 
humans is considered more upsetting than unintentional harm, and therefore triggers a larger 
WTP response to ameliorate the problem. 
These  findings  have  not  settled  the  debate;  rather,  they  have  created  another  one.  
Walker et al. [21] dispute the suggestion that people are more upset about man-made disasters 
than about natural ones, and are hence willing to contribute more to undo them.  In a study on 
how the cause of an environmental problem affects the disparity between WTP and willingness 
to accept (WTA), they find the opposite result for their WTP values – WTP to undo harm 
caused by humans was lower than WTP for natural damages.  Rather than an “outrage effect” 
triggered by the distinction between human versus natural causes per se, Walker et al. [21] 
hypothesize  that  WTP  is  driven  by  the  degree  of  responsibility  that  people  feel  for  the 
damages.
1  Building on this hypothesis, Brown et al. [1] postulate that “the identification of a   3
negligent party that has the ability to pay for some sort of restitution (such as a corporation) 
will lower the general public’s WTP, possibly even below WTP if the loss were caused by a 
natural process” ([1], p.490].  
In this paper, we use responses from 1335 Dutch households to sort out the various 
arguments.  The specific case we consider is conservation of a locally threatened species (seals 
in the Netherlands).  Our first objective is to test whether WTP indeed increases when humans 
instead of nature (a virus) cause the harm.  To disentangle outrage and responsibility effects, 
we distinguish between two (unintentional) types of human causes: (i) global warming, where 
society at large is responsible (and arguably everyone, albeit only minimally), and (ii) drilling 
for oil and gas, where in their pursuit of profits, industry causes the damage.  The outrage 
effect predicts that WTP for both human causes exceeds WTP for the natural cause.  The 
responsibility effect predicts that WTP to undo harm caused by oil- and gas-drilling firms will 
be lower than WTP to undo harm caused by global warming (and possibly even lower than 
WTP to undo damages caused by a natural virus). 
Our second objective is to investigate the effects of varying the framing of the WTP 
question in three alternative ways.  Cummings and Taylor [6, 7], List [15], and Carson et al. 
[4] find that people make lower bids in hypothetical valuation exercises when reasons for 
hypothetical bias are explicitly discussed or when they are told that their responses to valuation 
questions will have real consequences.  We test these issues in our field study and elicit WTP 
with a hypothetical valuation question, with a hypothetical question combined with a form of 
cheap talk, and finally with a hypothetical question indicating that the study results will be 
considered by policy makers.  The factorial experimental design employed allows causes to be 
crossed with scripts so that both types of treatments can be independently varied.     4
Several  interesting  insights  are  obtained.    First,  we  find  evidence  supporting  the 
outrage hypothesis.  People are willing to pay significantly more to protect seals when they 
appear to be threatened by an act of mankind (oil and gas drillers, greenhouse effect), rather 
than an act of nature (virus).    Second, we fail to find evidence in support of the responsibility 
hypothesis.  Third, we find that: (i) stated values obtained using cheap talk and consequential 
devices are significantly lower than comparable values obtained using a  hypothetical question 
without  these  treatments,  and  (ii)  stated  values  across  the  cheap  talk  and  consequential 
treatments  are  statistically  indistinguishable.
2    A    fourth  result  potentially  sheds  light  on 
another  ongoing  argument  in  non-market  valuation.  Cummings  et  al.  [5]  compare  the 
outcomes of actual and hypothetical bids and find that hypothetical referenda are not incentive 
compatible.    Haab  et  al.  [11]  debate  this  conclusion,  contending  that  it  may  be  due  to 
heteroskedasticity.    Because  we  vary  the  bid  presented  across  panellists,  we  can  test  for 
heteroskedasticity using the method developed by Cameron and James [3].  While the script 
affects bid levels, we do not find support for the hypothesis that the variance is affected when 
we vary the phrasing of the script.  This outcome provides weak support for the position of 
Cummings et al., but of course does not imply that heteroskedasticity will not be a problem in 
cases where real payments are considered – exploring this issue is left for future work. 
2.  Data and experimental design 
Data were obtained from a survey of participants in the CentERpanel, which consists of 
more  than  2,000  households  in  the  Netherlands.    Panel  members  are  selected  to  be 
representative of the Dutch population.
3  Panellists receive a “netbox” from CentER, Tilburg 
University, so that they can retrieve and return questionnaires via a television.  To ensure a 
good response rate, before panellists are selected, they  are interviewed to investigate their   5
commitment to completing questionnaires to be sent each week.  In practice, when given the 
chance, a large majority of households agree to be part of the CentERpanel. 
The analysis focused on declines in the seal population in the Waddenzee (an estuary in 
the North of the Netherlands), a problem that has been widely publicized in the Netherlands 
for many years.  The seal population reached a low point of about 300 animals in the 1970s.  
Currently the number of animals has recovered to some 2,000 seals, but that number is still 
much lower than the 18,000 seals that lived in the Waddenzee in the beginning of last century.  
The seal population is threatened by three possible and distinct developments.  First, new 
diseases (especially certain viruses) have taken a severe toll on the population in the past and 
continue to pose a serious threat.
4  Second, climate change and the associated rise of the sea 
level might trigger the disappearance of the seal’s breeding grounds.  Third, commercial oil 
and gas drilling may have the same effect, not because the sea level rises, but because the land 
level falls.  The threat from viruses represents the case in which the seal population may be 
harmed by natural causes for which no societal group is responsible, whereas with oil and gas 
drilling, actions taken by a comparatively small group of people for private gain contribute 
directly to the species hardship.  Climate change represents an intermediate situation in which 
virtually everyone is to some extent responsible for the problem.   
The survey began with a brief introduction (common to all groups), in which attention 
was  directed  to  the  declining  seal  population.    Then,  panellists  were  presented  with  a 
description of one of the three types of threats along with a plausible mitigation measure.  
These scripts, labelled virus, climate change, and oil and gas drilling, are shown below in 
translation to English from Dutch. 
1.  Virus: A number of factors continues to threaten the seal population.  One important 
threat is a new virus that undermines the species’ resistance to various diseases.  The   6
origins of the virus are unknown, but it is regarded as a “natural enemy” of the seal 
population.  The spreading of the virus is a natural process, independent of human 
actions.  It is possible that, without any preventive actions, the seal population in “the 
Waddenzee”  falls  by  some  50%.    An  effective  preventive  measure  would  be  a 
vaccination program. 
 
2.  Climate change: A number of factors continues to threaten the seal population.  One 
important threat is climate change, mainly caused by burning of fossil fuels.  Climate 
change (or the greenhouse effect) is a global problem because all people using fossil 
fuels are responsible for the emissions of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere (and not 
simply  people  in  the  Netherlands).    An  important  risk  of  climate  change  and  the 
associated rise of the sea level is that breeding grounds will be submerged for longer 
periods.  This will negatively impact on the ability of female seals to deliver and feed 
young seals.  It is possible that, without any preventive actions, the seal population in 
“the  Waddenzee”  falls  by  some  50%.    An  effective  preventive  measure  would  be 
elevating the existing sand banks by adding sand to them. 
 
3.  Oil and gas drilling: A number of factors continues to threaten the seal population.  
One important threat is drilling for gas by oil and gas companies in “the Waddenzee.”  
An important risk of gas exploitation is that the land level will fall so that breeding 
grounds will be submerged for longer periods.   This will negatively impact on the 
ability of female seals to deliver and feed young seals.  It is possible that, without any 
preventive actions, the seal population in “the Waddenzee” falls by some 50%.  An 
effective preventive measure would be elevating the existing sand banks by adding 
sand to them. 
  
After  the  threat  was  described,  panellists  were  asked  to  value  conservation  measures 
(vaccinations  or  elevating  sand  banks,  depending  on  treatment  type)  to  protect seals  from 
further harm.
5  In each case, panellists were asked one discrete choice valuation question using 
one  of  three  scripts.
6    Scripts  used  (labelled  hypothetical,  hypothetical/cheap  talk  and 
hypothetical/consequentialism) are shown below, again in translation to English from Dutch.  
A WTA script also was included in the survey.  Responses to this script are analysed in Bulte 
et al. [2]. 
1.   Hypothetical: The government can decide to take special measures to protect the seal 
population from the above-mentioned threat.  Such measures, however, are costly.  
Would you be willing to pay a one-time amount of DFL X to support protection of the 
seal population?  All the money would be used to finance a vaccination 
program/elevation of sand banks (choose appropriate case). 
   7
“yes” 
      “no” 
2.  Hypothetical/Cheap  Talk:  The  government  can  decide  to  take  special  measures  to 
protect the seal population from the above-mentioned threat.  Such measures, however, 
are costly.  Would you be willing to pay a one-time amount of DFL X to support 
protection  of  the  seal  population?    All  the  money  would  be  used  to  finance  a 
vaccination program/elevation of sand banks (choose appropriate case). 
 
Note: this is a hypothetical question!  You don’t have to actually pay the money.  In 
general,  people  experience  difficulties  answering  hypothetical  questions.    People 
typically bid more money then they are really willing to pay. 
 
One reason why people might be tempted to bid too much is as follows.  People try to 
accept or reject a bid based on their evaluation of the “true value” of the commodity (in 
this case, seal conservation in “the Waddenzee”).  But if people should actually make 
the payment, they also consider that they can spend their money only once and that 
money spent on seal conservation is not available for other purchases.   
 
When answering the bid question below, try to think whether you are really willing to 
pay this amount for the conservation of seals.  Try to imagine that this amount of 
money is no longer available to finance other purchases. 
 






3.  Consequentialism: The government can decide to take special measures to protect the 
seal population from the above-mentioned threat.  Such measures, however, are costly.  
Would you be willing to pay a one-time amount of DFL X to support protection of the 
seal  population?    All  the  money  would  be  used  to  finance  a  vaccination 
program/elevation of sand banks (choose appropriate case).  
 
Note: the results of this study will be made available to policy makers, and could serve 
as a guide for future decisions with respect to taxation for this purpose.  It is important 
that you think before answering the question. 
 






   8
The  survey  concluded  with  an  open-ended  de-briefing  question  that  invited  panellists  to 
provide comments about any of the questions.   About 80% of panellists did so.  Demographic 
information (income, schooling, age, gender, marital status, family size, province of residence) 
about  panellists  was  not  collected  in  the  survey  because  it  already  was  available  from  
CentERpanel. 
Regarding the elicitation of values, the cheap talk script is a shortened and revised 
version of the scripts used by Cummings and Taylor [7] and List [15].  While their scripts were 
longer, orally presented, and describe hypothetical bias in detail, a much shorter version was 
used here to reduce the amount of material presented to panellists.  Our script could be thought 
of as similar to the shorter cheap talk scripts used by Cummings and Taylor [7] and Poe et al. 
[17], which failed to eliminate hypothetical bias.  Also, use of consequentialism followed as 
closely as possible Carson et al. [4] and Cummings and Taylor [6], who use randomization 
devices  to  provide  subjects  with  uncertainty  about  whether  the  exercise  will  actually  be 
economically  binding.
7    In  theory,  use  of  consequentialism  should  provide  panellists  with 
incentives to state their true preferences.   
Our 3x3 experimental design crossed the three causes (virus, climate change, and oil 
and gas drilling) with the three valuation scripts (hypothetical, hypothetical/cheap talk, and 
consequentialism).  Each panellist was randomly assigned to one of the nine treatment cells.  
Within each cell, each panellist was presented with a randomly drawn bid from the set (DFL 
10, 40, 80, 120, where DFL 2.2 » Euro 1» US$1).  A preliminary version of the questionnaire 
was administered to 100 panellists who were randomly selected for a pilot test.  Among other 
things, the pilot was used to establish that the questions were understandable and that the bids 
presented  in  the  experiment  roughly  spanned  the  range  of  values  expressed  by  CentER   9
panellists.  The instrument was then revised and in September 2001, it was sent to all panellists 
who did not participate in the pilot experiment.  Panellists had 5 days to complete the survey 
‘on line,’ and no subject was assigned to more than one treatment.  In total, 1819 panellists 
responded--a response rate of more than 95%; and all panellists who responded answered all of 
the questions presented.  Eliminating the 433 panellists that received WTA valuation question 
reduces the sample to 1386.  After reviewing responses to the de-briefing question, the sample 
was further reduced to 1335 because 51 panellists said either that the threat to seals was not 
real or that the solution proposed would not work. The relatively low number of objections to 
the proposed method of intervention is consistent with Kahneman et al. [13], who argue that 
outcomes are likely insensitive to the types of intervention (also note that both elevation of 
sand banks and vaccination programs are “plausible” interventions; both have been mentioned 
in newspapers).  Nevertheless, whether these 51 panellists are eliminated from the data set has 
virtually no effect on the results presented in the next section.
8 
3.  Analysis 
This  section  analyses  whether  panellists  said  they  would  pay  the  bid  presented  to 
reverse damage to the seal population.  Analysis begins by comparing fractions of panellists 
across treatments that stated they would pay the amount presented in the survey to prevent 
further harm to the seal population in the Waddenzee.  These comparisons, presented in Table 
1, should be considered only as suggestive because the  percentage of responding panellists 
that  were  shown  the  four  bid  values  differs  between  treatment  cells.    As  demonstrated 
momentarily, the likelihood that a panellist would offer to pay the amount presented is smaller 
for larger bid values.  Nevertheless, it is useful to obtain at least a rough idea about treatment 
effects  before  proceeding  with  a  more  detailed  analysis.    In  pairwise  comparisons  of   10
proportions  shown  in  Table  1,  panellists  in  the  virus/hypothetical  with  cheap  talk  cell  are 
significantly less likely at the 1% level to agree to pay the stated bid amount than panellists in 
all other cells.  Pairwise comparisons of proportions setting oil and gas drilling/hypothetical 
with cheap talk against climate change/consquentialism, virus/consequentialism, and climate 
change/hypothetical with cheap talk also were significantly different at the 5% level.
9   
The  dichotomous  choice  responses  obtained  can  be  modeled  parametrically  by 
specifying the linear WTP function shown in equation (1).
10 
  Y=b0+b1DRILL+b2CLIMATE+b3CHEAPTALK+b4HYPOTHETICAL+Zg+u  (1) 
WTP  to  protect  seals  (Y)  is  expressed  in  terms  of  treatment  effects  (DRILL,  CLIMATE, 
CHEAPTALK, HYPOTHETICAL), a vector of controls for panellist characteristics (Z), and an 
additive  stochastic  preference  term  (u).    In  equation  (1),  the  bj  and  the  elements  of  g  are 
coefficients to be estimated and u is assumed normally distributed with variance s
2.  The 
constant term, b0, is interpreted as WTP to avoid the virus threat when values are elicited using 
consequentialism.   
Equation  (1)  is  estimated  using  binomial  probit  because  values  of  WTP  are  latent.  
Estimates of b and g in equation (1) are recovered using methods developed by Cameron and 
James [3].  Results are shown in Table 2.   Standard errors of coefficient estimates were 
computed via Taylor series expansion.  Covariates include treatment cell dummy variables and 
controls for gender, gross household income, schooling, years of age, and whether the panellist 
lives in Friesland or Groningen (the nearest provinces to the Waddenzee).  Other controls, such 
as panellists’ marital status and number of children were included in unreported regressions 
but  coefficients  of  these  variables  never  differed  significantly  from  zero  at  the  5%  level.  
Because  treatments  were  randomly  assigned  to  panellists,  they  are  orthogonal  to  panellist   11
characteristics.  Thus, provided that the true model of WTP is linear as shown in equation (1), 
alternative choices of controls have little effect on the estimated coefficients of the treatment 
variables.   
Six aspects of Table 2 are noted prior to discussing the main results.  First, estimates of 
expected WTP for each panellist, computed by inserting coefficient estimates into equation (1) 
are always positive, ranging from 0.41 Dfl to 156.76 Dfl, with an average of 81.08 Dfl across 
the entire sample.
11 Second, the null hypothesis that all nine treatments have the same effect on 
WTP (H0:  1  2  3  4=0) is rejected at the 5% level using a likelihood ratio test.  Third, 
panellists are significantly less likely at the 5% level to say they would pay higher bid values 
than lower bid values.  Fourth, women’s WTP is larger than WTP among men.  Fifth, gross 
household income, years of age, schooling, and proximity to the Waddenzee are not significant 
determinants of WTP.
12    The result for the variable measuring proximity to the Waddenzee 
suggests that the use value of seals is unimportant.  Sixth, the coefficient of the bid value is a 
point  estimate  for  –1/s,  so  that  an  estimate  of  s  across  all  treatments  (see  Column  4)  is 
(1.0/0.00717)=139.47.    In  this  context,  a  question  arises  whether  s  varies  across  different 
treatments, creating the type of heteroskedasticity problem highlighted by Haab et al. [11] in 
their comment on Cummings et al. [5].  Additional regressions were run (not presented here), 
specified in the same manner as equation (1), except that the price variable was interacted with 
the four treatment variables.  A likelihood ratio test indicates that the null hypothesis that 
coefficients of these interaction terms are jointly zero is not rejected at the 5% level; thus 
values of s across all treatments are statistically indistinguishable.   
Does the source or cause of an environmental problem affect WTP or, in other words, 
does the outrage effect exist?  As typically applied, standard utility theory holds that utility   12
depends solely on outcomes, and that the cause is unimportant.  If people value only outcomes 
and  do  not  care  about  the  cause,  then  in  equation  (1),  1  2=0.    This joint  hypothesis  is 
rejected at the 5% level using a likelihood ratio test.  Also, t-tests reject the individual null 
hypotheses that  1=0 and  2=0 at the 5% significance level.  Thus, the oil and gas drilling and 
the climate change treatments differ from the virus treatment:  people are willing to pay more 
to avoid man-caused environmental harm than if the harm occurs by an act of nature.  These 
results broadly support the existence of an outrage effect and are consistent with earlier work 
using museum visitors and undergraduates as subjects ([13], [14], [8], [1]). 
13 
Interestingly, and in contrast to the proposed “moral responsibility effect” advanced by 
[1] and [21], results in Table 2 do not reject the null hypothesis that  1  2 at the 5% level.  
Thus, WTP is not significantly different at conventional levels when the harm is caused by a 
specific group of people (oil and gas firms), as compared with when it is caused by society as a 
whole (climate change from greenhouse gas emissions).  In fact, contrary to predictions of the 
moral responsibility hypothesis, we find that WTP to undo harm caused by corporations does 
not  differ  significantly  at  the  5%  level  from  WTP  to  undo  harm  caused  by  society.    An 
alternative  explanation  for  our  result  could  be  that  people  consider  harm  caused  for  a 
corporation’s profits to be more “unfair” than harm caused by society at large, triggering more 
“outrage” and a larger contribution to offset the damages.  Analysing this issue in greater detail 
is left for another occasion, but see [9] and [10] for a discussion of “fairness” in economic 
thinking. 
  Does the method of eliciting values affect panellists’ WTP?  If elicitation method does 
not matter, then in equation (1)  3  4=0.  Using a likelihood ratio test, this joint hypothesis is 
rejected at the 5% level.  Also, in individual t-tests at the 5% level, the null hypothesis that   13
3=0 is not rejected and the null hypothesis that  4=0 is rejected, implying that responses in 
the hypothetical treatment differ from those in the consequentialism treatment, but there is no 
such difference between responses in the cheap talk and consequentialism treatments.  Further, 
the null hypothesis of no difference between the hypothetical treatment and the cheap talk 
treatment  (H0:  3  4)  is  rejected  using  a  likelihood  test  at  the  5%  level.    Because 
heteroskedasticity  does  not  explain  these  differences,  the  logical  conclusion  is  that  the 
hypothetical treatment yielded the largest WTP values.  Whether these results suggest that 
value statements in cheap talk and consequentialism treatments map into actual preferences is 
open for debate; yet, combined with findings from previous studies, these results support the 
notion  that  both  the  cheap  talk  and  consequential  treatments  can  provide  plausible  value 
estimates (e.g., Cummings and Taylor [6], Cummings and Taylor [7], List [15], Carson et al. 
[4]).
14 
The previously discussed probit estimates are obtained under the assumption that the 
error term, u, in equation (1) is normally distributed.  To examine the possible contribution of 
this assumption to our results, we considered two alternative tests that do not impose this 
distributional  assumption:  (1)  Chi-square  tests  for  response  differences  between  cause  and 
elicitation scripts and (2) Turnbull lower bound estimates of WTP (Haab and McConnell [12], 
pp. 72-78).  First, 72 Chi-square tests for differences in treatment effects (available from the 
authors on request) were carried out using the frequencies of yes/no responses to the valuation 
question in 2x2 contingency tables for each bid point in the experimental design (see Sheskin 
[18]).
15  Eight tests identified significant differences at the 5% level that are consistent with the 
probit  results  discussed  above  (differences  identified  are  between  the  hypothetical  and 
hypothetical/cheap  talk  scripts,  the  hypothetical  and  consequentialism  scripts,  the  oil/gas   14
drilling and virus scripts, the oil/gas drilling and climate change scripts, and the climate change 
and  virus  scripts.    Two  of  the  Chi-square  tests  show  a  significant  difference  between  the 
hypothetical/cheap talk and consequentialism scripts.  However, in one case, the fraction of 
“yes”  answers  to  the  hypothetical/cheap  talk  script  exceeded  that  for  the  consequentiaism 
script,  whereas  in  the  other  case  the  reverse  outcome  obtained.    This  outcome  may  be 
responsible for the result reported in Table 2 indicating no significant difference between these 
two treatments.  Overall, the comparatively small number of significant differences found in 
the Chi-square tests suggest that differences between treatment effects may not be large and 
the probit analysis may be allowing a few design points to dominate the results.      
Second, the Turnbull estimates (available from the authors on request) are roughly the 
same order of magnitude but exhibit less variation across treatments than do those based on the 
probit estimates.  Consistent with the results above, using standard differences in means tests 
we find that the Turnbull estimates are significantly larger at the 5% level for treatments using 
the hypothetical question than for those using either cheap talk or consequentialism.  Estimates 
are generally larger for the treatment cells involving oil and gas drilling, but the differences are 
not always statistically significant at the 5% level.  In any case, the Turnbull estimates are 
broadly consistent with those obtained from the probit analysis.   
 
4.  Conclusions 
We conducted a field experiment using a large Dutch panel to examine the effects of 
context and framing on the WTP to conserve seals in the Netherlands.  Based on our probit 
analysis, we cautiously draw several conclusions. We find that WTP to protect seals from 
harm is affected by the nature of the threat.  The patterns of results suggest that the “outrage   15
effect” plays a role.  We also find that framing matters – stated WTP is conditional on whether 
bid values are elicited with hypothetical questions, or using a hypothetical format that either 
contains “cheap talk” or mention of possible consequences of the survey.  We find that stated 
values in “cheap talk” and “consequentialism” treatments are significantly lower than stated 
values in a hypothetical question without these additions.  We also find that alternative tests 
that do not impose the normality assumption do not discriminate between these effects as 
sharply as those based on the probit analysis.   
Consistent with earlier psychological work, we find evidence to support the hypothesis 
that preferences are conditional on context – they appear to be constructed on a case-by-case 
basis.  From a normative perspective, if both outcomes and causes are important, then a good 
deal  of  economic  theory,  including  CVM,  should  be  reconsidered  as  utility  is  typically 
measured over levels, not over levels and what induced that level.  In a positive sense, if 
antecedents are important, then policymakers must take into account this piece of information 
when crafting optimal policy.   
On  the  brighter  side,  the  finding  concerning  the  method  of  eliciting  WTP  is 
encouraging.  Since it is difficult to move beyond hypothetical surveys, it is of considerable 
interest to understand whether panellists take the valuation question seriously.  Interestingly, 
the  cheap  talk  and  consequentialism  treatments  yield  comparable  value  estimates.    This 
suggests that CVM studies can be improved by including these devices.  
One might speculate that providing additional information about the consequences of 
the stated bid (in terms of foregone consumption opportunities or impact on policy-making) 
triggers a move from one mental map to another––almost as if a switch is flipped.  When 
responding to purely hypothetical questions, people may not provide their full attention.  Yet   16
when reminded of the consequences of their actions, a ‘serious’ response is warranted.  Our 
results indicate that exactly how people are reminded does not seem to matter much.  We 
suspect this will be a topic of considerable future interest given that CVM remains the “only 
game in town” to gather total values of non-marketed goods and services.     17
Endnotes 
1 The idea for a moral responsibility effect originates from results in Kahneman and Ritov [14] 
where the human-versus-nature effect is large in case of general pollution but small in case of 
a human predator. Note, however, that in a similar setting Kahneman et al. [13] find, on the 
contrary, a large effect in case of a human predator, so that the issue seems far from settled. 
2Of course, it is an open question how these hypothetical payments would compare to the case 
of real payments.  Institutional restrictions on how the panel could be used prevented asking 
them to make actual cash payments.   
3Additional information regarding the panel is available at www.centerdata.nl. 
4As a matter of fact, one of these three threats did affect the seal population shortly after 
completing the data collection.  A virus killed a significant share of the population and experts 
predict that as much as half of the population might die as a result.   
5  In order to  get realistic cases, we have to vary  not only the  cause but also the solution 
(proposed intervention) – a vaccination program for the virus threat and elevation of sand 
banks for the climate change and gas drilling cases.  Subramanian and Cropper [20] show that 
people could also care about the characteristics of regulatory programs, but Kahneman et al. 
[13]  suggest  that  this  effect  is  relatively  unimportant.    We  ignore  the  effect  of  different 
interventions but, as described more fully below, delete 51 observations where panellists used 
the debriefing question to object to the proposed solution. 
6The dichotomous choice approach was used in the valuation exercise because it appears to be 
incentive compatible [5], but it has the disadvantage that survey panellists' willingness to pay 
values are not directly revealed.     18
7To  avoid  misleading  panellists,  environmental  policymakers  in  the  Netherlands  were 
informed of the study before execution and subsequently briefed on the major results.   
8Another tabulation of responses to the de-briefing question suggests that some people are 
opposed to paying for environmental problems caused by oil and gas firms.  One conjecture is 
that these panellists might provide a value because it is the only available way to register their 
unhappiness with the situation.  However, only 33 of 450 panellists who received the oil/gas 
drilling script stated that they thought  firms should pay  and that the panellists themselves 
should  not;  and  of  these  persons,  31  refused  to  pay  the  bid  value  presented.    These  33 
responses  were  retained  in  the  data  set.    We  thank  Mark  Dickie  for  encouraging  the 
investigation of this point. 
9 Difference between means tests were performed to test for demographic differences between 
treatment cells.  In the cases of age, whether a partner is present, and gender, the homogeneity 
null was never rejected at the 5% level assuming unequal population variances (Sheskin [18]).  
For gross income, the null hypothesis of no difference between cell means was rejected in one 
pair-wise comparison, but this outcome occurs because the income of one sample member was 
an outlier.  Mean numbers of household members and mean numbers of children present in the 
household, however, exhibited more variation between treatment cells and the null hypothesis 
of no difference between means of these variables was rejected in a few instances.  Details of 
these tests are available from the authors on request. 
10A log-linear WTP model also was estimated.  Results for both treatment effects and control 
variables tell essentially the same story as those for the linear WTP model estimates described 
below.     19
11 Averages of panellists’ expected WTP by cause and by elicitation method are available from 
the authors on request.  
12Other income measures tried were net income of panellists and gross and net income of the 
panellist’s  household.    When  substituted  for  gross  income  of  panellists  in  the  Table  2 
regression, these variables were also insignificant.  Dummy variables defined on the quartiles 
of all four of these variables also were tried with no appreciable change in results.  Details are 
available from the authors upon request.  
13 Now that we find that cause matters, it is of course important to rethink the formal model 
that underlies the CVM.  Smith [19] introduces the idea to use a CES sub function in the 
indirect  utility  function,  in  case  one  wants  to  relax  the  standard  assumption  of  perfect 
substitutability, in order to get a parameter for a degree of substitution.  A similar line could be 
explored in this case but we leave that exercise for future work. 
14See List and Shogren [16] for a literature review of the comparison between hypothetical and 
actual statements of value.   
15Thirty-six (4x3x3) Chi-square tests compared responses to two elicitation scripts for given 
causes and bid values, and 36 additional tests compared responses to two causes for given 
elicitation scripts and bid values.  Results of these tests are available from the authors on 
request.    20
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aStandard errors in parentheses.  
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 Table 2: Probit Estimates of Treatment Effects (n=1335) 
 
Variable  Mean 
 
Estimates of E and J 
(std. error) 
Constant  ----  53.73
* 
(27.78) 
Bid Value  62.11  ----
b 
Oil/gas drilling  0.338  43.82
* 
(13.22) 




  0.340  ----
a 
Hypothetical/Cheap Talk  0.317  -4.44 
(12.16) 








Panellist is male  0.546  -39.69
* 
(11.21) 
Household monthly gross income 
(in Dutch guilders) 
14099.83  -0.667E-05 
(1.41E-06) 
Panellist has primary education  0.045  -1.78 
(27.54) 
Panellist has secondary education  0.363  7.80 
(16.44) 
Panellist has university education  0.120  ----
a 
Panellist has vocational education  0.473  27.24 
(16.21) 
Years of age  46.12  0.03 
(0.353) 
Proximity to the Waddenzee  0.082  -10.48 
(17.93) 
aDenotes omitted dummy variable.  
bThe estimate of s is -(-1/0.00717)=139.47, with standard error of 17.08. 
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Table A1:  Experimental Design: Sample Sizes by Treatment (N=1335) 
 









Dfl 10; n = 40 
Dfl 40; n = 38 
Dfl 80; n = 37 
Dfl 120; n = 50 
 
 
Dfl 10; n = 41 
Dfl 40; n = 29  
Dfl 80; n = 33 
Dfl 120; n = 29 
 
 
Dfl 10; n = 36 
Dfl 40; n = 48 
Dfl 80; n = 43 






Dfl 10; n = 32 
Dfl 40; n = 44 
Dfl 80; n = 45  
Dfl 120; n = 35 
 
 
Dfl 10; n = 29 
Dfl 40; n = 33 
Dfl 80; n = 39 
Dfl 120; n =33 
 
 
Dfl 10; n = 37 
Dfl 40; n = 31 
Dfl 80; n = 33 






Dfl 10; n = 37 
Dfl 40; n = 34 
Dfl 80; n = 36 
Dfl 120; n = 31 
 
 
Dfl 10; n = 41 
Dfl 40; n = 34 
Dfl 80; n = 48 
Dfl 120; n = 34 
 
 
Dfl 10; n = 36 
Dfl 40; n = 47 
Dfl 80; n = 37 
Dfl 120; n = 36 
 
Notes:  Each cell represents four unique treatments.  For example, “Dfl 10” in row 1, column 1 
denotes that one treatment had 40 subjects answering a dichotomous choice question on whether 
they would pay Dfl 10 to save the seals when they are threatened by nature and the question is 
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aStandard errors in parentheses. 
bAt the 5% level, mean age of panellists in the climate change/hypothetical treatment is different from mean age 
in both the climate change/consequentialism and the oil and gas drilling/hypothetical cheap talk treatments.  Also, 
at  the  5%  level,  mean  age  in  the  virus/hypothetical  treatment  is  different  from  mean  age  in  the  climate 
change/consequentialism treatment  Pairs of other means are not significantly different at the 5% level.  
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aStandard errors in parentheses. 
bDifference between means tests show no significant differences  between cells at the 5% level. 
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aStandard errors in parentheses. 
bAt the 5% level of significance, mean gross monthly household income of panellists in the virus/hypothetical cell 
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aStandard errors (in parentheses), which are computed based on the values of expected WTP in each treatment 
cell, understate variability of expected WTP because they do not account for shocks entering the model through 
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 Table 6A: Chi-Square Tests of Differences Between WTP Elicitation Treatments Given 
Assignment of the Oil and Gas Drilling Treatment 
  P=Dfl 10   P=Dfl 40  P=Dfl 80  P=Dfl 120 
Hypothetical vs. Cheap Talk  0.60  1.07  0.01  0.15 
Hypothetical vs. Consequentialism  0.76  1.77  0.66  0.03 
Cheap Talk vs. Consequentialism  0.02  5.78
*  0.65  0.05 




Table  7A:  Chi-Square  Tests  of  Differences  Between  WTP  Elicitation  Treatments  Given 
Assignment of the Climate Change Treatment 
  P=Dfl 10   P=Dfl 40  P=Dfl 80  P=Dfl 120 
Hypothetical vs. Cheap Talk  1.88  0.40  0.74  0.01 
Hypothetical vs. Consequentialism  0.00  4.84
*  2.81  0.04 
Cheap Talk vs. Consequentialism  2.11  2.20  0.70  0.09 




Table  8A:  Chi-Square  Tests  of  Differences  Between  WTP  Elicitation  Treatments  Given 
Assignment of the Virus Treatment 
  P=Dfl 10   P=Dfl 40  P=Dfl 80  P=Dfl 120 
Hypothetical vs. Cheap Talk  7.41
*  6.46
*  0.80  2.05 
Hypothetical vs. Consequentialism  0.06  2.75  0.55  1.95 
Cheap Talk vs. Consequentialism  5.84
*  1.33  2.66  0.01 




   31
Table 9A: Chi-Square Tests of Differences Between Cause Treatments Given Assignment of 
the Hypothetical/Cheap Talk Elicitation Treatment 
  P=Dfl 10   P=Dfl 40  P=Dfl 80  P=Dfl 120 
Oil/Gas Drilling vs. Climate Change  0.58  0.76  0.88  0.24 




Climate Change vs. Virus  0.81  5.25
*  1.89  2.75 
*denotes significant at 5% level with one degree of freedom 
 
 
Table 10A: Chi-Square Tests of Differences Between Cause Treatments Given Assignment of 
the Hypothetical Treatment 
  P=Dfl 10   P=Dfl 40  P=Dfl 80  P=Dfl 120 
Oil/Gas Drilling vs. Climate Change  0.00  0.65  0.00  0.04 
Oil/Gas Drilling vs. Virus  0.03  0.13  1.65  0.21 
Climate Change vs. Virus  0.04  0.20  1.83  0.07 
*denotes significant at 5% level with one degree of freedom 
 
 
Table 11A: Chi-Square Tests of Differences Between Cause Treatments Given Assignment of 
the Consequentialism Treatment 
  P=Dfl 10   P=Dfl 40  P=Dfl 80  P=Dfl 120 
Oil/Gas Drilling vs. Climate Change  0.76  0.02  5.67
*  0.33 
Oil/Gas Drilling vs. Virus  0.64  0.01  2.08  3.60 
Climate Change vs. Virus  0.00  0.06  1.18  1.86 
*denotes significant at 5% level with one degree of freedom 
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Table 12A: Turnbull Estimates of Lower Bound Willingness to Pay by Treatment 
Treatment  Willingness to Pay 
Oil and Gas Drilling/Hypothetical with Cheap Talk  $37.04 
Oil and Gas Drilling/Hypothetical  $66.80 
Oil and Gas Drilling/Consequentialism  ---
a 
Climate Change/Hypothetical with Cheap Talk  $53.62 
Climate Change/Hypothetical  $68.40 
Climate Change/Consequentialism  $52.20 
Virus/Hypothetical with Cheap Talk  $36.70 
Virus/Hypothetical  ----
a 
Virus/Consequentialism  $59.80 
aCould not be computed because the percentage of “no” responses presented did not increase monotonically with 
bid values.   33
 
 